Can Thailand meet all its energy needs with the renewable energy sources it currently uses?
At present, the answer is not entirely. Thailand has a range of renewable energy options, including solar, wind and biomass. These sources are already being deployed, contribute to reducing dependence on fossil fuels, and form an integral part of the country’s energy transition.
However, each renewable energy source has distinct limitations concerning the continuity of electricity generation, resource availability and suitability for different applications. Thailand’s energy transition therefore requires a combination of technologies rather than reliance on a single renewable energy source.
These considerations are particularly relevant to sectors with specific energy requirements.
Hard-to-abate industries require substantial and continuous supplies of high-temperature heat. Steel production, for example, involves heating materials in furnaces, while cement production requires processing raw materials in rotary kilns at temperatures exceeding 1,000°C.1 Electricity generated from solar photovoltaic systems alone may be insufficient to meet these requirements or may not directly replace the fuels used in existing processes.
Long-distance transport relies on heavy-duty vehicles to carry large volumes of goods. Constraints relating to battery size, weight and charging time can limit the suitability of electric propulsion for these applications.
Industries requiring stable and continuous electricity may experience significant disruption to production processes following voltage fluctuations or power outages. This includes data centres, a sector in which the Thai government has encouraged foreign investment and which requires substantial, continuous supplies of renewable electricity.2 Solar photovoltaic systems, however, generate electricity only when sunlight is available. Battery energy storage systems (BESS) are not yet sufficiently deployed to fully sustain electricity supply over extended periods.
These limitations do not diminish the importance of existing renewable energy sources. They indicate that these sources, in their current applications, cannot yet meet every category of energy demand in Thailand, but will need to be built out and scaled in the short- to mid-term.
The energy transition consequently requires a range of complementary technologies to address different system needs.
This article examines two technologies that might contribute to addressing these gaps: hydrogen and small modular reactors (SMRs). It considers the challenges associated with their deployment and the preparations Thailand would need to undertake before adopting them.
Hydrogen: The challenge of high production costs
Hydrogen (H₂) is a colourless, odourless gas used as a feedstock in oil refining and chemical production. It can also provide high-temperature process heat for industries such as steel and cement, or generate electricity through fuel cells. Energy applications include fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEVs) and hydrogen energy storage systems (HESS). When combusted, hydrogen produces water vapour (H₂O) without releasing carbon dioxide (CO₂).3
Hydrogen’s role in the energy transition lies in its ability to store and transport energy for later use. Energy from different sources can be converted into hydrogen, which can then be stored, transported and supplied as fuel when needed. When produced using clean energy, hydrogen can help reduce emissions in sectors that are difficult to electrify, including certain heavy industrial processes and long-distance transport.
However, hydrogen is an energy carrier rather than a primary energy source. Unlike fossil fuels or renewable resources such as sunlight and wind, it generally requires an energy input to produce. Production involves separating hydrogen from compounds such as water or methane (CH₄), using energy and feedstocks from other sources.
Its emissions profile therefore depends on how it is produced as well as how it is used. The absence of CO₂ emissions at the point of combustion does not, on its own, make hydrogen a low-carbon fuel.
Hydrogen is commonly classified by colour according to its production pathway. Grey hydrogen is produced from natural gas, releasing greenhouse gases during production. Blue hydrogen follows a similar process but incorporates carbon capture and storage (CCS) to capture CO₂ for underground storage. Green hydrogen is produced through water electrolysis powered entirely by renewable electricity, offering the lowest production emissions among these pathways.
Nevertheless, data published by the Department of Alternative Energy Development and Efficiency in 2024 indicate that more than 95% of global hydrogen production remains grey hydrogen.4 Thailand likewise relies primarily on grey hydrogen, with oil refineries accounting for the largest demand at more than 300,000 tonnes annually. Green hydrogen production has yet to reach an industrial scale in the country.
The cost challenge for green hydrogen
The first challenge to expanding industrial use of green hydrogen is its production cost, which remains substantially higher than that of grey hydrogen. Data from 2025 indicate that grey hydrogen costs approximately USD 2–2.5 per kilogram, compared with USD 8–10 per kilogram for green hydrogen. Costs can therefore differ by as much as a factor of five between the two production pathways.5
In Thailand, where access to renewable electricity remains limited, replacing grey hydrogen with green hydrogen is not yet commercially viable.
This cost differential raises questions about the hydrogen blending targets in the earlier draft Power Development Plan (PDP2024). The draft proposed blending 5% hydrogen with natural gas for electricity generation, with the share gradually increasing to 75% by 2050. The policy was estimated to cost approximately USD 700 million annually while reducing greenhouse gas emissions by less than 2%.6 An assessment by the Siam Commercial Bank Economic Intelligence Center (SCB EIC) also indicated that using low-carbon hydrogen for electricity generation could increase generation costs and electricity tariffs per unit in 2040 by 28% and 5%, respectively.7
The second challenge is the lack of dedicated storage and transport infrastructure. Hydrogen’s low density, reactivity and effects on metals under high-pressure conditions require specialised systems. Options include transporting compressed hydrogen through pipelines constructed from compatible materials, storing liquid hydrogen at approximately −253°C, or using suitable geological formations for underground storage, such as salt domes or depleted natural gas fields.
Thailand has undertaken several pilot initiatives. A hydrogen demonstration station in Chonburi Province, developed through cooperation between PTT, OR, Toyota and BIG, tests hydrogen storage and refuelling for FCEVs operating as a shuttle service at U-Tapao Airport.8 The Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) has also developed a wind–hydrogen hybrid project to test the use of HESS for storing surplus electricity generated by wind turbines. These initiatives remain limited in scale and require further development before they can support industrial deployment.
Policy uncertainty presents an additional constraint. With PDP2026 still under preparation, the Hydrogen Roadmap for the energy sector—which is intended to establish targets and strategies for hydrogen development and use—also remains under revision. Its completion depends on the approval and official adoption of PDP2026.
This uncertainty creates a cycle that is difficult to resolve. An unclear policy direction discourages private investment in infrastructure and the expansion of pilot projects to an industrial scale. Limited production, in turn, constrains opportunities to reduce green hydrogen costs. Persistently high costs then restrict market growth and the attraction of further investment.
At the same time, international environmental measures, including the European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), and the RE100 commitments of multinational companies operating across supply chains are expected to increase demand for green hydrogen. If the necessary infrastructure is not in place, Thailand risks losing investment opportunities and competitiveness.
Strategic priorities for green hydrogen in Thailand
Given the slow expansion of green hydrogen production for industrial use, Thailand’s immediate priority is to establish a strategic approach to its deployment. Research under the project “Clean, Affordable and Secure Energy for Southeast Asia” (CASE)9 identifies several principles for ensuring that green hydrogen is used effectively.
First, define its role and prioritise appropriate applications. Green hydrogen should be directed towards uses that cannot be readily served by electricity. Initial efforts should focus on oil refining, the largest existing hydrogen user, before extending to heavy industry and long-distance transport. Promoting widespread hydrogen use without clear priorities could increase national electricity demand by as much as 75% by 2050. This would raise system costs and could increase reliance on hydrogen imports if domestic production proved insufficient.
Second, accelerate the expansion of renewable electricity generation. Electricity accounts for approximately half of green hydrogen production costs, making affordable renewable electricity essential to improving competitiveness. With accelerated renewable energy deployment, green hydrogen costs in Thailand could decline to USD 5–7 per kilogram by 2030. In the Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC), where large refineries coincide with strong solar potential, costs could fall below USD 6 per kilogram.
Before committing to additional large-scale infrastructure, Thailand should also assess the potential for hydrogen storage in salt caverns in the Northeast. Existing work remains at the preliminary study stage. A more comprehensive assessment would help avoid infrastructure commitments that could prove uneconomic over the longer term.
Small modular reactors: A technology awaiting wider commercial validation
While green hydrogen could address some energy needs, the requirement for stable and continuous electricity remains. This is particularly relevant to sectors with substantial electricity demand, including data centres and artificial intelligence (AI), which are projected to account for approximately 40% of Thailand’s electricity demand by 2050.10 11These developments reinforce the need for sources capable of delivering large volumes of electricity consistently.
Understanding SMRs
An SMR is a small nuclear power plant incorporating a reactor that controls the occurrence and rate of nuclear reactions. Its defining characteristic is modular production: units are manufactured in a factory and subsequently transported to the intended site for installation and assembly.
Each module generally has an electricity generation capacity of up to 300 MW, approximately one-third of the capacity of a conventional nuclear power plant.
Compared with large nuclear power plants, modular production is supposed to allow greater control over manufacturing quality within a factory environment. It might also provide flexibility in generation and maintenance, as individual modules could be started or shut down separately. Additional modules may be installed as electricity demand increases, without constructing an entirely new plant.12
This approach would improve construction efficiency by reducing on-site construction time from five to six years to three to four years. Smaller plants also require less land: approximately 100 rai, compared with 1,000 rai for a conventional plant. These characteristics could help reduce overall construction costs.13
SMRs also incorporate passive safety systems, which use natural physical processes, including gravity and the buoyancy of steam, to support cooling and automatic shutdown without relying on external electricity or human intervention. These designs reflect lessons from previous nuclear accidents, including the 1986 Chernobyl disaster in the Soviet Union, in present-day Ukraine, and the earthquake and tsunami affecting Japan’s Fukushima nuclear power plant in 2011.
From projected benefits to operational evidence
According to World Nuclear Association figures dated 1 July 2026, there were 133 SMR projects across 21 countries. Only two, in Russia and China, were officially operational. Five were under construction, while the remaining 126 were at the planning or development stage.14 15
SMRs therefore remain predominantly first-of-a-kind (FOAK) projects. Their anticipated cost-effectiveness and safety performance have not yet been demonstrated widely through commercial deployment. Early projects face considerable implementation and performance risks, contributing to high market-entry costs.16
More limited economies of scale also mean that early SMRs have higher construction costs, commonly referred to as overnight costs, than conventional nuclear power plants. Their levelised cost of electricity (LCOE) is estimated at approximately USD 90–160 per megawatt-hour (MWh),17 remaining above that of large nuclear power plants and natural gas power plants. 18
Costs may decline over time as commercial deployment expands. Achieving such reductions, however, requires a sufficient and sustained volume of projects. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that costs would need to decline to approximately USD 4,500 per kilowatt in the United States and Europe, and USD 2,500 per kilowatt in China, by 2040 for SMRs to become cost-competitive and support wider deployment.19
Challenges for SMR development in Thailand
In addition to the cost and technology uncertainties faced internationally, Thailand must address several country-specific challenges.
First, public communication and understanding. Public perceptions of nuclear technology remain strongly associated with nuclear weapons and power plant accidents. Nuclear power plants use nuclear reactions differently from nuclear weapons, while SMR designs incorporate safety improvements informed by experience with conventional plants. These distinctions must be communicated effectively if they are to contribute to public understanding.
A study in the United Kingdom examined stakeholder engagement and public acceptance of SMR development using household survey data from residents living within a one-mile radius of two proposed SMR sites, supported by quantitative analysis.
The findings indicated that stakeholder engagement can strengthen trust in a project. Engagement is most effective when it enables inclusive, two-way participation, rather than relying on one-way information provision or symbolic consultation. Local public meetings, user-friendly websites and accessible language were identified as examples of transparent and legitimate communication practices (Osiolo & Mukundan, 2026).20
Second, legal and regulatory preparedness. Thailand’s Nuclear Energy for Peace Act B.E. 2559 (2016) establishes a licensing framework. However, the Office of Atoms for Peace (OAP) has noted that the legislation primarily establishes safety requirements rather than facilitating the development of commercial nuclear power plants. SMR development must would need to also align with international requirements for nuclear infrastructure readiness.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which promotes the peaceful use of nuclear energy and develops nuclear safety and security standards, has established the Milestones Approach to guide countries considering their first nuclear power plant.
The approach covers 19 nuclear infrastructure issues across three phases:
- Phase 1: Assessment before a decision to proceed. This includes feasibility studies and consideration of whether nuclear power is appropriate for the country.
- Phase 2: Preparation before construction. Following a decision to proceed, countries must establish the necessary institutions, legislation and regulatory arrangements.
- Phase 3: Construction and commencement of operation. This phase supports the systematic implementation and operation of the first nuclear power plant.
Based on the IAEA’s experience and assessments, countries without previous nuclear power programmes may require approximately 10–15 years from initial consideration to the operation of their first plant.21
Thailand has established a knowledge base and completed the IAEA’s first-phase assessment. In practice, however, it remains in preparation for Phase 2. Two areas continue to present constraints: public understanding and acceptance, and the development of legal and regulatory arrangements.22 Within the latter, key gaps include:
- Overlapping regulatory responsibilities. According to an analysis by Assistant Professor Dr Piti Eiamchamroonlarp of Chulalongkorn University’s Faculty of Law, SMR construction falls under both the Nuclear Energy for Peace Act B.E. 2559 (2016) and the Energy Industry Act B.E. 2550 (2007). This creates overlapping responsibilities between the OAP and the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC), particularly regarding construction inspection and oversight. 23
- The absence of legislation governing civil liability for nuclear damage. Such legislation would establish responsibility in the event of an accident, the extent of liability and the arrangements for compensation. These provisions are fundamental requirements for investors and insurers. They would also provide public assurance of access to fair legal protection. The OAP has recognised this gap and is advancing efforts to develop the necessary legislation.24
Third, workforce capacity and safety culture. SMR operation requires specialists across several disciplines, including nuclear engineering, reactor operation and radioactive waste management. It also requires an organisational culture that prioritises safety at every level. These requirements form part of the 19 nuclear infrastructure issues addressed through the IAEA Milestones Approach.25
Fourth, radioactive waste management. Particular attention is required for high-level radioactive waste arising from nuclear fuel use. Although this represents a small proportion of total waste—approximately 3% by volume for a 1,000 MW nuclear power plant—it has high levels of heat and radioactivity and requires long-term management.
Thailand has no previous experience managing high-level radioactive waste. The process involves an initial storage period of approximately 40–50 years to allow radioactivity to decline, followed by treatment into solid form to facilitate storage and, ultimately, disposal in a deep geological repository designed to isolate the waste from the environment and prevent contamination.
Some studies indicate that SMRs could generate 2–30 times more radioactive waste per unit of electricity than large nuclear power plants. Smaller reactor cores may result in a higher proportion of neutron leakage, with escaping neutrons interacting with surrounding structures and rendering those materials radioactive. 26
Fifth, dependence on international suppliers. Proceeding with SMRs would require Thailand to import the technology. At present, Russia and China are the only countries with officially operating SMRs, while projects elsewhere remain under development. Supplier selection therefore involves financial commitments, technology-transfer conditions and strategic relationships, alongside technological considerations. These decisions also carry security and geopolitical implications.
Priorities for Thailand’s consideration of SMRs
SMRs may offer potential benefits, but remain complex technologies undergoing development and commercial validation. Thailand should therefore undertake a careful assessment before entering binding commitments.
In the short term, preparations can focus on the foundations required for an informed decision: strengthening legal and regulatory arrangements, developing knowledge and workforce capacity, establishing a safety culture, and ensuring accessible public communication and meaningful participation. These measures have value in their own right and would improve Thailand’s ability to assess SMRs as the technology matures.
At this stage, Thailand should avoid premature financial or political commitments to a particular supplier. With limited evidence of costs and performance across a broad range of commercial projects, assuming such risks without sufficient information would undermine sound decision-making.
Conclusion
Green hydrogen and SMRs could contribute to addressing gaps in Thailand’s energy system. Both, however, face high costs associated with limited market scale. SMRs also present additional questions concerning technological maturity and national preparedness.
The government has supported hydrogen pilot projects and is expected to include SMRs in the draft PDP2026. Nevertheless, the readiness of both technologies for wider practical deployment remains uncertain, and the timing of their development cannot be predicted with confidence.
While these technologies continue to develop, Thailand’s immediate priority should be to expand renewable energy options with demonstrated practical viability. Particular attention should be given to investment in energy storage and grid modernisation to strengthen system flexibility. These measures can address clean energy needs immediately, serve a substantial share of demand, and provide infrastructure that will remain useful regardless of the future development of green hydrogen and SMRs.
Policy commitments must also be supported by institutional, legal and workforce development. Most importantly, Thailand needs to define the role of each technology clearly, identifying the applications for which it is appropriate and the specific energy system needs it can address.
A successful energy transition extends beyond reducing greenhouse gas emissions through the deployment of clean energy technologies. It also requires a power system capable of integrating renewable energy and delivering electricity to users reliably and efficiently.
The next article in the Energy Transition series will examine the rationale for grid modernisation and the approaches that could support Thailand’s energy transition.
- Preecha Concrete Pile. (n.d.). Cement production: Processes, stages and related technologies.
https://www.preechaconcretepile.co.th/cement-production-process/#3-การเผาไหม้-clinker-burning ↩︎ - อภิภูชยะกุล, ณ. (2024, June). Why is clean energy important in the competition for data centre investment? POST TODAY. https://www.posttoday.com/smart-city/709780 ↩︎
- กลุ่มติดตามฯ กตป. (2023, July). Hydrogen energy: An alternative energy source for the future. Office of Natural Resources and Environmental Policy and Planning.
https://www.onep.go.th/พลังงานไฮโดรเจน-พลังงาน/ ↩︎ - Department of Alternative Energy Development and Efficiency. (2024, September). Hydrogen energy.
https://www.dede.go.th/articles?id=7219 ↩︎ - Barrera, F., Colak, E., Pujantoro, M., Saelim, S., Lee, S., & Kiatgrajai, M. (2026, February). Identifying where renewable-based hydrogen adds value: Strategic priorities for Thailand’s energy sector. Clean, Affordable and Secure Energy for Southeast Asia (CASE).
https://caseforsea.org/post_knowledge/identifying-where-renewable-based-hydrogen-adds-value-strategic-priorities-for-thailands-energy-sector/ ↩︎ - Barrera, F., Colak, E., Pujantoro, M., Saelim, S., Lee, S., & Kiatgrajai, M. (2026, February). Identifying where renewable-based hydrogen adds value: Strategic priorities for Thailand’s energy sector. Clean, Affordable and Secure Energy for Southeast Asia (CASE).
https://caseforsea.org/post_knowledge/identifying-where-renewable-based-hydrogen-adds-value-strategic-priorities-for-thailands-energy-sector/ ↩︎ - Policy Watch Editorial Team. (2024, July). The new PDP introduces hydrogen energy from 2030. Thai PBS Policy Watch.
https://policywatch.thaipbs.or.th/article/economy-75 ↩︎ - Manager Online. (2022, November). Four major companies—PTT, OR, Toyota and BIG—open Thailand’s first hydrogen refuelling station. MGR Online.
https://mgronline.com/business/detail/9650000106734 ↩︎ - Barrera, F., Colak, E., Pujantoro, M., Saelim, S., Lee, S., & Kiatgrajai, M. (2026, February). Identifying where renewable-based hydrogen adds value: Strategic priorities for Thailand’s energy sector. Clean, Affordable and Secure Energy for Southeast Asia (CASE).
https://caseforsea.org/post_knowledge/identifying-where-renewable-based-hydrogen-adds-value-strategic-priorities-for-thailands-energy-sector/ ↩︎ - Calculation note: The proportion is calculated using figures from the draft PDP2026: projected electricity demand from data centres and AI of 30,000 MW, compared with projected national electricity demand in 2050 of 71,340 MW under the low-demand scenario and 77,374 MW under the high-demand scenario. See reference 11. ↩︎
- หวังธิติธีรกุล, ธ. (2026, July). PDP2026 targets 70% clean energy and a fourfold increase in small modular reactor capacity. Thai PBS Policy Watch.
https://policywatch.thaipbs.or.th/article/economy-270 ↩︎ - World Nuclear Association. (2026, May). Small modular reactors.
https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-power-reactors/small-modular-reactors/small-modular-reactors ↩︎ - Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand. (2024, September). Understanding SMRs: A new step for clean energy in Thailand.
https://www.egat.co.th/home/20240930-art01/ ↩︎ - World Nuclear Association. (2026, July). Small modular reactor (SMR) design database. Retrieved 22 July 2026.
https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-power-reactors/small-modular-reactors/small-modular-reactor-smr-design-database ↩︎ - เลิศจิตต์ธรรม, ว. (2026, June). How many small modular reactor power plants are there worldwide? The Standard.
https://thestandard.co/smr-nuclear-power-plants-global/ ↩︎ - InfoQuest. (2026, January). Power of the Act: The bankability of SMR nuclear power projects.
https://www.infoquest.co.th/2026/562986 ↩︎ - Units note: Electrical energy consumed over time is measured in watt-hours (Wh). One electricity unit equals one kilowatt-hour (kWh); therefore, 1,000 units equal one megawatt-hour (MWh). ↩︎
- ลีน้อย, ป. (2026, April). Small modular reactors (SMRs): An option or a necessity for Thailand’s clean energy future? Krungsri.
https://www.krungsri.com/th/research/research-intelligence/smr-2026 ↩︎ - International Energy Agency. (2025, January). The path to a new era for nuclear energy.
https://www.iea.org/reports/the-path-to-a-new-era-for-nuclear-energy ↩︎ - Osiolo, H. H., & Mukundan, S. (2026). From promise to legitimacy: A survey-based study of stakeholder engagement and public acceptance of small modular reactors in the UK. Energy Conversion and Management: X, 30, 101860.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecmx.2026.101860 ↩︎ - International Atomic Energy Agency. (n.d.). Milestones approach.
https://www.iaea.org/zh/node/41247 ↩︎ - Prachachat Business. (2026, January). Thailand faces two outstanding IAEA requirements; EGAT says it is time for a decision on nuclear power.
https://www.prachachat.net/economic/news-1946497 ↩︎ - เอี่ยมจารูญลาภ, ป. (2025, November). Power of the Act: The law and the safety of SMR nuclear power plants. InfoQuest.
https://www.infoquest.co.th/2024/447530 ↩︎ - Bangkok Biz News. (2025, March). Office of Atoms for Peace advances nuclear civil liability legislation to strengthen public confidence in SMRs.
https://www.bangkokbiznews.com/environment/1171643 ↩︎ - International Atomic Energy Agency. (n.d.). Milestones approach.
https://www.iaea.org/zh/node/41247 ↩︎ - ทีฆะกุล, ก. (2026, July). Research indicates SMRs could generate 2–30 times more radioactive waste than large nuclear power plants. Thansettakij.
https://www.thansettakij.com/sustainable/environment/664014 ↩︎
